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Internet Media in Technological Risk




The purpose of this paper is to analyze claims made about the
plutonium on the Cassini-Huygens spacecraft by mission supporters
and opponents on the new media terrain of the Internet. Analysis
focuses on claims made about the degree of risk involved, citizen
control over risk exposure, fairness in the distribution of risks, benefits
from the mission, and trust in governmental institutions responsible for
risk assessment and management. Variations in framing by gender and
by discernible self-interest are also addressed. Of particular interest is
the alteration of the relationships among risk assessors, risk managers,
and the public by the debut of a new medium, the Internet.
Risk assessment science and risk management policy presumably
inform one another in natural and technological hazard situations.
Policy toward any given hazard is forged in sometimes contentious
debates between risk assessment scientists and risk management
decision-makers (who are elected politicians with risks to their own
careers possibly riding on these debates). Impinging on these two sets of
players are influences from companies and agencies with different
interests in the outcome and citizen pressure. Citizen pressure is
generated by public interest activists, many of whom are quite
sophisticated at educating the public about their takes on issues and
adroit in stimulating political activism among the newly-informed.'
* Dr. Rodrigue is Chair and Professor of Geography at California State University, Long
Beach, CA. She earned her Ph.D. from the Graduate School of Geography at Clark University.
E-mail: rodrigue@csulb.edu.
1 An elected decision-maker is faced with a set of career risks in deciding what to do in
response to public pressure about a given issue, including risk management policy decisions.
These risks can be understood in terms of Type I and Type II errors in statistics. Facing
constituent pressure concerning a given technological risk, an elected decision-maker may
decide the null hypothesis is true and the constituent communications are representative of the
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Media plays a crucial role in the social construction of a given
hazard. Many of the debates about risks play out in the distorting
presence of print and broadcast media. Media portrayal of a hazard
affects individual perceptions and agency reactions to the event and
influences the meaning people place on it. Unfortunately, the media
have goals that may not dovetail with the information needs of society
or the communication needs of risk assessment scientists.
Media have been roundly criticized for the sensationalism 2 and
biases3 they display in covering disasters and hazardous situations.
Risk assessment scientists, risk management policy makers, and activists
do not control the media, nor do they have the resources to produce
and distribute their own information about hazards. They are
feelings of most constituents and act accordingly. If the communications are in fact not
representative, s/he may alienate the bulk of constituents by doing so, a Type II error. If the
communications are representative of the will of the majority and an elected official fails to
recognize this, the official faces a Type I error in choosing to ignore the communications. See
Larry C. Heiman, Acceptable Risks: Politics, Policy, and Risky Technologies (1997).
2 See e.g. Thomas A. Birkland, Natural Disasters as Focusing Events: Policy Communities
and Political Response, 14 (2) Intl. J. of Mass Emergencies and Disasters 221 (1996); Ute J.
Dymon & Francis P. Boscoe, Newspaper Reporting in Wake of the 1995 Spring Floods in
Northern California, 81 Quick Response Report (1996) (available at <http://www.colorado.
EDU/hazards/qr/qr8 1.html>); D. Elliott, Tales from the Darkside: Ethical Implications of
Disaster Coverage, Bad Tidings: Communication and Catastrophe (Lynne M. Walters, Lee
Wilkins, & Tim Walters eds., 1989); Roger E. Kasperson et al., The Social Amplification of
Risk: A Conceptual Framework, 8 Risk Anal. 177 (1988); Karen Lowrie et al., Hazards, Risk,
and the Press: A Comparative Analysis of Newspaper Coverage of Nuclear and Chemical
Weapons Sites, 11 Risk. Health, Safety & Environment 49 (2000); Allan Mazur, A Hazardous
Inquiry: The Rashomon Effect at Love Canal (Harvard Univ. Press 1998); Allan Mazur,
Looking Back: Unneeded X-rays, 11 Risk- Health, Safety & Environment 1 (2000); Allan
Mazur, Technical Risk in the Mass Media, 5 Risk. Health, Safety & Environment 189 (1994);
Conrad Smith, Media and Apocalypse: News Coverage of the Yellowstone Forest Fires, Ex-on
Valdez Oil Spill, and Loma Prieta Earthquake (Greenwood Press 1992); Robert A. Stallings,
Hindsight, Organizational Routines and Media Risk Coverage, 5 Risk: Health, Safety &
Environment 223 (1994).
3 See e.g. Mike Davis, The Case for Letting Malibu Burn, Ecology of Fear: Los Angeles
and the Imagination of Disaster (Metropolitan Books 1998); Marla Perez-Lugo, The Alass
Media, Political Fragmentation, and Environmental Injustice in Puerto Rico: A Case Study of
the Floods in Barrio Tortugo, 113 Quick Response Rpt. (1999) (available at
<http://www.colorado.EDU/hazards/qr/qrl13.html>); Christine M. Rodrigue et al.,
Construction of the "Northridge" Earthquake in Los Angeles' English and Spanish Print
Media: Damage, Attention, and Skewed Recovery, Southern California Environment and
History Conference (1997) (available at <http://www.csulb.edu/-rodrigue/ scehc97.html>);
Eugenie L. Rovai, The Social Geography of Disaster Recovery: Differential Response to the
North Coast Earthquakes, 56 Y.B. of the Assn. of Pacific Coast Geographers 49 (1994);
Eleanor Singer & Phyllis M. Endreny, Reporting on Risk: How the Mass Media Portray
Accidents, Diseases, Disasters and Other Hazards, 5 Risk. Health, Safety & Environment 241
(1994).
Rodrigue: Risk Amplification 223
dependent upon traditional print and broadcast media. There is often a
disconnect between what risk assessment scientists and policy makers
want to communicate to the public and the type of information the
media needs to convey to attract audiences and advertiser revenue.
Activists are in a slightly better situation, since they can more
appropriately generate events, such as demonstrations, that might
appeal to the media's need for sensation and human drama.
Of growing importance, however, is the increasing use of Internet
media in these discussions to generate awareness and political activism.
The Internet allows technical experts and activists to bypass media they
do not control and to get messages out in forms they can control to
relatively large audiences.
The Internet may alter information acquisition in hazards
communication and thereby affect the balance of power among various
stakeholders. E-mail, UseNet, listservers, chats, and Web pages have
very modest costs of entry. It is difficult for a few powerful media
businesses to govern their content, consciously or inadvertantly. More
importantly, the Internet also enables the exponential expansion of
communication through the forward button. Because of the Internet,
ordinary citizens and risk assessment scientists might have the ability to
communicate their messages with nearly the efficiency of traditional
media. Several questions emerge: Will depolarization of power in
communication amplify or attenuate perception of risk? How will it
alter the social meaning of a hazard and behavior towards it, including
political behavior? How might the Internet affect the interaction
between risk assessment science and risk management policy in a
democracy?
This paper traces the impact of the Internet on the dialogue
between risk assessment and risk policy in the case of the plutonium on
board the Cassini-Huygens mission to Saturn and Titan. This
technological risk controversy is particularly noteworthy for the degree
to which it was carried out on the Internet, spanning as it did the period
during which the Internet exploded into a powerful medium
competitive with television, radio, and print media in the United States.
The next section provides a background on the mission itself, the bases
of the National Aeronautical and Space Administration's (NASA's)
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decision to use plutonium and an Earth gravity-assist, the objections
raised by anti-nuclear activists, and the impact of activism in the
controversy.
Background on the Controversy over the Cassini-Huygens Mission
The Cassini-Huygens mission to the Saturn planetary system is the
largest, most ambitious, and most international project ever undertaken
by NASA or its partners, the European Space Agency (ESA) and the
Agenzia Spaziale Italiana (ASI). The orbiter and its probe are seven
meters high, four meters wide, and weigh more than 5,600 kg. They
house eighteen instruments that will be used to conduct twenty seven
experiments of Saturn's rings, icy satellites, magnetosphere, and
Titan.4
NASA dismissed the use of solar power for mission instrumentation
and temperature maintenance needs for several reasons. First, the 5,655
kg mass of the orbiter and its navigational fuel, even without massive
solar arrays, was already very close to the 5,760 kg launch limits of the
largest American expendable launch vehicle, Titan IV/Centaur
combination. Second, the duration of the mission to Saturn and
extremity of the conditions at Saturn require absolutely dependable
and durable power sources. NASA concluded solar panels could not
satisfy those conditions. Third, the orbiter will make repeated passes
through Saturn's ring system, and solar panels are both highly
susceptible to impact damage and provide large targets for such
damage. Fourth, NASA put a premium on minimizing the number of
moving parts that could fail, after the disastrous deployment failure of
the high-gain antenna on the Galileo spacecraft in April 1991. Fifth,
Saturn is located about 9.5 astronomical units (AU) or 1.4 billion
kilometers from the sun. At that distance, applying the inverse square
law, solar energy receipt is about 1% that at Earth. Solar panels in
optimum condition would, therefore, have to be about 500 square
meters in size to be effective. They would thus be enormously heavy,
entail many moving parts to deploy and struts to support, and require
heavy batteries. 5
4 See NASA, Passage to a Ringed World: The Cassini-Huygens Mission to Saturn and
Titan (Linda J. Spilker ed., 1997) (available at <http://www.jpl.nasa.gov/cassini/english/
teachers/pub/passage/>).
5 See NASA, Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Cassini Mission (Solar
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For these reasons, NASA decided on the compact radioisotope
thermoelectric generator (RTG) and radioisotope thermal unit (RHU)
design as the orbiter's power sources. These generate heat and, in the
case of the RTGs, electrical power through the alpha radiation emitted
by ceramicized plutonium-238 dioxide. Pu-238 is non-fissile and
cannot sustain chain reactions the way Pu-239 and Pu-241 can.6 The
collisional energy of the large alpha particles striking the ceramic in
which the Pu-238 is embedded generates heat. The heat maintains the
instruments at operating temperature in the extreme cold and is
converted into electricity to power their operation. The RTGs and
RHUs became the center of controversy in 1995, due to their
incorporation of 33 kg of plutonium dioxide. Plutonium was
characterized by John Gofman "the most fiendishly toxic substance
ever known" in 19747 and subsequently popularized by Ralph Nader
"the most toxic substance known" in 1975.8
Adding to the controversy, NASA further opted for a Venus-
Venus-Earth-Jupiter Gravity Assist (VVEJGA) trajectory. 9 Gravity
assist entails exchanging angular momentum with a planet by swinging
a spacecraft past it in the direction of the planet's revolution. Gravity
assist would boost Cassini-Huygens to the velocity it needed to reach
the Saturn system during the careers of its science teams. The gravity
assist element led to accusations that Cassini could strike Earth or
otherwise break up and explode in the Earth's atmosphere, distributing
its plutonium throughout the Earth's atmosphere. 10 If the plutonium
Exploration Division, Office of Space Science, 1995); NASA, Final Supplemental
Environmental Impact Statement for the Cassini Mission (Solar Exploration Division, Office of
Space Science, 1997) (available at <http://www.jpl.nasa.gov/cassini/english/msnsafel>).
6 Norman Holden, Table of the Isotopes (Revised 1998), CRC Handbook of Chemistry
and Physics (David R. Lides ed., 2000).
7 Testimony provided by John Gofman in Comm. v. Sam Lovejoy (excerpted at
<http://-www.ecn.cz/temelin/Lovejoy.htm#Gofman>).
8 This Ralph Nader quotation is frequently cited and often unattributed. It was made in a
debate between Nader and Ralph Lapp in 1975, in which Nader stated that one pound of
plutonium could kill every human being on Earth. The debate is discussed in Theodore
Rockwell, Discussions of Nuclear Power Should Be Based in Reality, 12 The Scientist (March
16, 1998) and in Bernard L. Cohen, The Myth of Plutonium Toxicity, Nuclear Energy 355-
365 (Karl 0. Ott & Bernard I. Spinard eds., Plenum Press 1985).
9 See NASA (1995), supra n. 5, at 1, 3-4, 2-74; NASA (1997), supra n. 5, at Sec. 2.
10 See e.g. Daniel Chong, Nukes in Space: The Final Frontier? NASA To Launch Nuclear-
Powered Space Probe, Awareness Mag. (Sept./Oct. 1997) (available at
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were thereby vaporized into particles small enough to be inhaled but
large enough not to be exhaled, the radiation from an embedded
particle could indeed induce cancer through the concentration of its
energy within the very small penetration radius of alpha radiation. 1
The risk management questions raised included: How likely is such
an accident scenario? What would happen to the RTGs and RHUs in
such an accident? What would be the number and size distribution of
plutonium dioxide particles released by an explosion? Where would
fine particles fall? What is the probability of a person being at that
location to inhale the appropriately sized particles in that distribution?
Risk assessment performed for NASA as part of the mission's
Environmental Impact Statement characterized the risk of plutonium
release on launch or a swingby accident as negligible and acceptable at
levels that would not be statistically observable over a five decade
timeframe. 12
By 1995, opposition to the mission had begun to organize. 13 Anti-
Cassini activists were skeptical of any risk assessment performed for
NASA, and questioned the independence of the outside agencies and
individuals consulted by NASA. The activists came up with their own
<http:llwww.awarenessmag.com/sepoct7.htmllso7_nuke.html>); Karl Grossman, Risking the
World: Nuclear Proliferation in Space, Covert Action Q. (Summer 1996) (available at
<http://www.projectcensored.org/c1997.htm#1>); Russell D. Hoffman, Cassini: An In-Depth
Look (Jan. 30, 1997) (available at <http://wvw.animatedsoftxvare.com/cassini/cassiplu.htm>);
Michio Kaku, A Scientific Critique of the Accident Risks from the Cassini Space Mission, The
Real News Page (Aug. 1997) (available at <http://www.americanreview.net/kakul.htm>).
11 See J. C. Nenot & J. W. Stather, The Toxicity of Plutonium, Americium, and Curium
(Pergamon Press 1979).
12 All estimates for any of the launch phases for expectation and maximum scenarios were
below one health effect, i.e., surplus cancer death. See NASA (1995), supra n. 5, at 4.57-
4.58. For an inadvertant entry during the Earth swingby, depending on the angle of re-entry,
the estimate ranged from 1,910 to 3,480 excess deaths developing over five decades, a level that
would not be statistically observable among the 1 billion or so deaths normally expected in that
time frame. Id. at 4.59. This estimate was calculated without the controversial de minimis
assumption of an allegedly harmless dose of 0.001 rem. These estimates were revised
downward in the Final Supplemental EIS of 1997 after application of new probabilistic safety
analyses and more detailed descriptions of accident and environment scenarios. For pre-launch
and launch accidents, expected surplus deaths again remained below one for all phases, and
worst case scenarios resulted in less than 1% probabilities of from 0.55 to 1.50 surplus deaths
being exceeded, depending on the time of failure. See NASA (1997), supra n. 5, at 2.20-2.22.
For inadvertant entry failures, there was a substantial drop in expected excess deaths, to 120,
with a 1% probability of 450 surplus deaths being exceeded. Id. at 2.22-2.23.
13 Signaled by the publication of Karl Grossman & Judith Long, Apollo Outtakes, The
Nation (Sept. 11, 1995) (available at <http:l/wvw.animatedsoftware.coml
cassini/kg9509na.htm>).
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risk estimates, ranging from over 200,000 deaths 14 to 1 million
deaths (attributed to John Gofman by Grossman) 15 and 4.6 million to
9.2 million deaths (Ernest J. Sternglass quoted on the NoFlyBy web
site) 16 to as many as 40 million deaths (attributed to Sternglass by
Grossman). 17 The timeframe of these predicted surplus deaths is not
specified. The opponents further claimed that NASA was imposing an
unnecessary risk, in light of improvements in solar technology. They
argued that solar power would have been an option, even at Saturn,
where incoming solar radiation is one percent that at Earth. 18 They
openly wondered if Cassini were part of some military conspiracy to
acclimate Americans to "nukes in space" so that space could be
"weaponized."19
From 1995 through October 1997, the opposition movement
concentrated its efforts on creating pressure to abort the October 1997
launch of Cassini. 20 The launch went forward, so the movement then
focused on aborting the flyby, scheduled for August 1999.21 The
movement was unsuccessful in stopping either of these events, but it did
generate enormous controversy and put a lot of pressure on Congress,
the White House, and the courts. 2 2  Several senators and
14 Kaku, supra n. 10, at top of document.
15 Karl Grossman, The Risk of Cassini Probe Plutonium, Christian Science Monitor
(October 10, 1997) (available at <http://www.csmonitor.com/durable/1997/10/10/
opin/opin.l.html>).
16 See NoFlyBy <http://www.flybynews.com/> (accessed November 7, 2001).
17 See Grossman, supra n. 15.
18 J. Turner, Nuking the Final Frontier, 5 (4) Shift (1997).
19 See e.g. Helen Caldicott, Nukes in Space Are a Serious Threat to Us All, Sydney
Morning Herald (August 18, 1999) (available at <http:/l/www.gn.apc.org/
cndyorks/yspace/articles/caldicott.htm>); Karl Grossman & Jonathan Mark, The FORCE
behind Cassini (Press Release, July 21, 1999) (available at <http://wwv.flybynews.com/
archives/alerts/18n.htm>); Karl Grossman, Address, Space Use and Ethics (Darmstadt,
Germany, Mar. 4, 1999) (available at <http://wwwv.flybynews.com/archives/karl/ethics.htm>);
Al Decker, Hey NASA: Send It Up Uranus! - Opposition to Cassini Heats Up, EarthFirst! J.
(available at <http://www.enviro web.org/ef/old/Lughnasadh97/Cassini.html>).
20 See e.g. Stop Cassini Newsletter index (available at <http://www.animatedsoftvare.com
/cassinilnltrs/index.htm>). This claim is at least partly based on statements by the American
military about its mandate to assure American military control of space. See e.g. United States
Space Command, Long Range Plan: Implementing USSPACECOM Vision for 2020
(available at <http://www.peterson.af.mil/ usspace/LRP/cover.htm>).
21 See e.g. NoFlyBy site, supra n. 16.
22 See e.g. Dave Weldon, NASA s Cassini Mission Is Safe, Space News (September 22-28,
1997)(available at <http://www.reston.comlnasalcongresslO9.05.97.weldon.cassini.html>).
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representatives signed a public petition against the mission, and
California Senator Barbara Boxer commissioned a study by the U.S.
Government Accounting Office entitled, "Space exploration - power
sources for deep space problems." 23 State and local government
representatives were pressured to declare their jurisdictions in
opposition to the launch or flyby. Several responded, including the
Massachusetts House of Representatives, which passed a resolution to
abort the launch, as did the Newton, Massachusetts City Council; the
Santa Cruz, California City Council; and the Marin County Board of
Supervisors. 24 The movement may not have achieved its original goals,
but it was highly effective in making RTG and RHU use controversial,
which may, in turn, affect the design, authorization, and funding of
future missions. 25
Besides a number of print media and television pieces on the
controversy, 26 most of the day-to-day activism took place on E-mail
and listservers, the Web, and on UseNet. 27 Indeed, many of the
23 See U.S. Government Accounting Office, Space Exploration - Power Sources for Deep
Space Problems, GAO/NSIAD-98-102 (1998) (available at <http://www.gao.govl
archive/1998/ns98102.pdf>).
24 See Grossman, supra n. 15; City of Santa Cruz, City Council Minutes of 9/9/97
(available at <http:lwwv.ci.santa-cruz.ca.us/cc/archives/97/9-9m.html>); and Manin County
Resolution No. 97-26 (available at <http://www-l.marinorg.netlmc/boslbosagmn/
a970325.txt>).
25 See e.g. Regina Hagen, Nuclear Powered Space Missions - Past and Future (Aug. 11,
1998)(available at <http://wwwv.globenet.free-online.co.uklianus/npsmindex.htm>).
Controversy over RTGs has encouraged innovation within NASA concerning alternative power
sources for deep space missions, including efforts to develop solar concentrators and more
efficient thermoelectric conversion devices for RTGs to minimize the amount of Pu-238
required. See Glenn Research Center & NASA, Deep Space Solar Stirling (Jan. 4, 2000)
(available at < http://wv.lerc.nasa.govlWX'W/tmsb/dynamicpower/doc/stirling-deepsolar.
html>). The Discovery Program of smaller missions explicitly forbids designs dependent on
RTGs although the smaller RHUs are permissible. See NASA, DRAFT for Community
Comment, Announcement of Opportunity, Discovery Program (Jan. 9, 1998) (available at
<http://spacescience.nasa.gov/aodraft/discoveryldiscdrft.txt>).
26 For examples of print media pieces on the controversy, see William J. Broad, Powered
by Plutonium, Saturn Mission Provokes Warnings of Danger, N.Y. Times (Sept. 8, 1997)
(available at <http://wwwv.flybynews.com/archives/ref/nyt98.htm>); Karl Grossman, Nuclear
Menace in Outer Space, Baltimore Sun (Dec. 8, 1996) (available at
<http://vwwv.flybynews.com/archives/ref/kg9612ba.htm>); Robyn Suriano & Tony Boylan,
Demonstration ends with 27 arrested, Florida Today (Oct. 5, 1997) (available at
<http://wwv.flybynews.com/archives/ref/flt105.htm>). For examples of broadcast media
pieces, see Cassini Segment, 60 Minutes (CBS News Co., Oct. 5, 1997) (transcript available at
<http://www.prop1.org/2000/cassini/971005fl.htm>); Karl Grossman, Nukes in Space: The
Nuclearization and Weaponization of the Heavens (1995); Nukes in Space IL Unacceptable
Risks (1998), EnviroVideo, Box 311, Ft. Tilden NY 11695; Interview by Art Bell Coast to
Coast Radio Show with Michio Kaku (Sept. 24, 1997).
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traditional media pieces germane to the subject wound up as E-mails
and Web pages. Internet activism resulted in demonstrations that were
then covered by conventional media.
The dense and rapidly increasing network of connections among
people in cyberspace clearly offered a way for the politically active to
bypass the constraints of conventional print and broadcast media to get
their messages directly into the hands of readers. Readers could easily
propagate the messages themselves, so that, ultimately, a handful of
activists communicated with hundreds of thousands of people
indirectly through the power of the forward button. The Cassini
controversy exemplifies the power of the Internet in information
propagation and activist recruitment.
Hazard Perception
My purpose in examining this controversy included testing several
hypotheses from the hazards perception literature. One of the most
common statements in the literature is that there is a marked difference
in hazard perception on the part of risk assessment experts and the lay
public. The lay public is often described as being ill-informed and,
therefore, as offering little valuable input in risk management policy
decisions.28 A variant on this vision of the public as poorly informed is
expressed in statements that suggest that, lacking the time and training
to evaluate certain risks, people will form their opinions about risks by
27 For examples of web pages, s e e <http://www.flybynews.com>,
<http:/lwww.animatedsoftware.comlcassini/>; <http:llwww.rain.orgl-openmind/cassini.
htm>,<http://www.jpl.nasa.gov/cassini/>; <http://www.jpl.nasa.gov/cassinilenglishl msnsafe/>.
28 For statements expressing reservations about raw public input, see e.g. Norman
Augustine, What We Don't Know Does Hurt Us: How Scientific Illiteracy Hobbles Society,
279 Science 5357 (1998); Baruch Fischhoff, Acceptable Risk: A Conceptual Proposal, 5 Risk
Health, Safety & Environment 1 (1994); Sharon M. Friedman, The Media, Risk Assessment
and Numbers: They Don't Add Up, 5 Risk Health, Safety & Environment 203 (1994). For
statements that public input is seen as limited in value by risk assessors and managers, see e.g.
Branden Johnson, Advancing Understanding of Knowledge's Role in Lay Risk Perception, 4
Risk Health & Safety 189 (1993); Frances M. Lynn, Public Participation in Risk Management
Decisions: The Right to Define, the Right to Know, and the Right to Act, 1 Risk Health &
Safety 95 (1990); Thomas 0. McGarity, Public Participation in Risk Regulation, 1 Risk
Health & Safety 103 (1990); Kristin S. Shrader-Frechette, Perceived Risks versus Actual Risks:
Managing Hazards through Negotiation, 1 Risk Health & Safety 341 (1990); Paul Slovic,
Beyond Numbers: A Broader Perspective on Risk Perception and Risk Communication in
Acceptable Evidence: Science and Values in Risk Management (Deborah G. Mayo & Rachelle
D. Hollander eds., Oxford University Press 1991).
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deferring to the opinions of reference groups they trust. Once these
opinions are formed, they become very resistant to contrary
evidence.2 9
Douglas and Wildavsky have proposed a model based on cultural
predispositions toward risk assessment and tolerance. 30 They describe
a "center" approach characteristic of people at, or near, the core of
political power. These people demonstrate respect for rational risk
assessment, acceptance of the hierarchical structure of modern society
that privileges them, and willingness to tolerate a certain degree of risk
if it is offset by greater benefits enabled by assumption of that risk.
Douglas and Wildavsky also define a "border" approach, associated
with people peripheral to social power who are suspicious of the center,
fearful of pollution of the natural environment by the self-serving power
elite, and unimpressed by a rationality seen as serving central interests.
They are generally described as possessing egalitarian social values and
being politically oppositional. Basically, this model describes expert
opinion as "centrist" and lay opposition to technology as "borderer."
This model, an extension of the ill-informed public hypothesis, has
generated an enduring debate between those who would dismiss the
public and those who value lay hazard perception in a democratic
society.
Many critics of the Douglas and Wildavsky model argue that lay
hazard perception may reflect a more nuanced and multifaceted
consideration of risk than do the narrowly focused mortality and
morbidity calculations of risk assessment experts. 3 1 The concern of
this literature is that the public will overestimate risks, and perhaps even
29 See e.g. Vincent T. Covello et al., Guidelines for Communicating Information about
Chemical Risks Effectively and Responsibly in Mayo & Hollander, supra n. 28; Johnson,
supra n. 28; Howard Margolis, Dealing with Risk: Why the Public and the Experts Disagree
on Environmental Issues (The Univ. of Chicago Press 1996); Slovic, supra n. 28; Paul Slovic et
al., Rating the Risks: The Structure of Expert and Lay Opinions, Risk in the Technological
Society (Christoph Hohenemser & Jeanne X. Kasperson eds., Westview Press 1982).
30 See Mary Douglas & Aaron Wildavsky, Risk and Culture: An Essay on the Selection of
Technical and Environmental Dangers (Univ. of Cal. Press 1982).
31 See e.g. Kristin S. Shrader-Frechette, Evaluating the Expertise of Experts, 6 Risk-
Health, Safety & Environment 115 (1995); Margolis, supra n. 29; Andrew F. Fritsche, The
Moral Dilemma in the Social Management of Risks, 7 Risk: Health, Safety & Environment
291 (1996); Slovic, supra n. 28; Slovic et al., supra n. 29; Eeva K. Berglund, Knowing Nature,
Knowing Science: An Ethnography of Local Environmental Activism (The White Horse Press
1998); Lennnart Sjdberg, World Views, Political Attitudes, and Risk Perception, 9 Risk
Health, Safety & Environment 137 (1998).
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be aroused into political activism against risks, if any of the following
dimensions are present: lack of control, lack of familiarity, unfairness,
dread, or mistrust.
People will accept quite high levels of risk if they perceive
themselves as controlling their own risk exposure but will become very
upset at even the most trivial risk if they feel it is being imposed on
them. 32 People are also more tolerant of risks that are familiar to
them, e.g., cars versus planes. 33 The public will accept higher risk in a
situation they see as benefiting them, but they will become agitated if
they perceive that they are assuming the risk and someone else is
gaining the benefit.3 4 Dread attaches to any hazard, no matter how
tiny its probability, if the hazard's imaginable consequences include
sheer horror, particularly frightening diseases, or transmission of harm
to future generations. The horror of Hiroshima, and the slowly growing
realization that even minute exposures to radioactive substances can
result in mutation and cancer, ensures that any potentially nuclear
hazard evokes dread. 3 5 Social concern over hazards may become
amplified far beyond the risk assessed by experts if the institutions
responsible for assessing risk and protecting the public are themselves
under suspicion. Public trust of governmental institutions in general
seems to have hit a decades-long slide in the wake of revelations of
gross government misconduct, conspiracy theorizing from both left and
right, and a pervasive "X-Files" mentality.36 Lastly, many studies have
found differences in risk perception or tolerance along ethnic, age, and
gender lines. These differences perhaps reflect the relative situatedness
of these aspects of identity along the fairness, control, familiarity, and
trust axes of this and many other social issues.37
32 See Slovic, supra n. 28; Slovic et al., supra n. 29.
33 Slovic et al., supra n. 29.
34 See e.g. Berglund, supra n. 31; Margolis, supra n. 29; Kristin S. Shrader-Frechette, First
Things First: Balancing Scientific and Ethical Values in Environmental Science, 88 (2) Annals
of the Assn. of Am. Geographers (1998).
35 See e.g. Slovic, supra n. 28; Vincent Covello, Risk Comparisons and Risk
Communication, Communicating Risk to the Public (Roger E. Kasperson & Pieter Jan M.
Stallen eds., Kluwer 1991).
36 See e.g. Douglas & Wildavsky, supra n. 30; Berglund, supra n. 31; Fritsche, supra n.
31; Margolis, supra n. 29; Sheila Jasonoff, Acceptable Evidence in a Pluralistic Society, in
Mayo & Hollander, supra n. 28; Howard Kunreuther et al., Risk Perception and Trust:
Challenges for Facility Siting, 7 Risk: Health, Safety & Environment 109 (1996).
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As stated earlier, the purpose of this paper is to analyze the claims
made about the plutonium on board the Cassini-Huygens spacecraft, as
expressed on the Internet. Many questions derive from this literature:
1. Do Internet debates on Cassini raise the issue of perceived control
over plutonium?
2. Are issues of fairness in the social distribution of the mission's risks
and benefits raised by the mission's opponents and proponents in their
debates online?
3. Do Cassini opponents focus on expressing or eliciting dread?
4. If so, since dread is a more compelling emotion than the scientific
curiosity and romance of space-exploration motivating mission
proponents, are opponents more numerous and more vocal than
proponents?
5. Is suspicion of governmental institutions generally, or of NASA
specifically, used by opponents to discredit the risk assessment
performed by or under contract to NASA?
6. Can demographic variations be discerned among the people
contributing to this debate online? If so, are these demographic
differences associated with different percentages of authors in opponent
and proponent stances?
7. Does self-interest affect the propensity to contribute to this debate?
Does the removal of identifiably self-interested individuals significantly
change the balance of authors and messages between support and
opposition to the Cassini-Huygens mission?
8. Is there evidence for the claim that people rely on trusted reference
groups to form political opinions on issues beyond their technical
training? Does this vary between mission opponents and proponents?
9. Can Douglas and Wildavsky's center/border dichotomy be
discerned in the values and concerns raised in the content of the
messages themselves? Do mission proponents express more confidence
37 See e.g. Denise Blanchard-Boehm, Risk Communication in Southern California: Ethnic
and Gender Response to 1995 Revised, Upgraded Earthquake Probabilities, 94 Quick
Response Report (1997) (available at <http://www.colorado.EDU/hazards/qr/qr94.html>);
John-Paul Mulilis, Gender and Earthquake Preparedness, 14 (1) AustralianJ. of Emergency
Mgt. (1999) (available at <http://www.ema.gov.au/5virtuallibrary/pdfs/vol14nol/
mulilis.pdf>); Robert T. Bolin, Martina Jackson, & Allison Crist, Gender Inequality
Vulnerability and Disasters: Issues in Theory and Research, Through Women's Eyes: The
Gendered Terrain of Natural Disaster (Elaine Enarson & Betty Hearn Morrow eds., Praeger
1998).
Rodrgue: Risk Amplification 233
in science and mission opponents express more counter-cultural
perspectives?
10. Does the use of the Internet for political communication create an
effective alternative channel for risk management agenda-setting to the
traditional print and broadcast media and lobbying?
Data and Methods
The Internet varies in the degree to which it can be investigated for
research purposes. For example, the Web contains a huge population of
sites devoted to one aspect or another of this controversy, but this
population is quite unstable through time, as people change their
websites and discard materials no longer of immediate interest.
Listservers number in the dozens, if not hundreds, of thousands, 38 but,
while the lists themselves can be located through several search services,
postings on them are archived (or not) by the individuals running each
list. Chats are by their nature ephemeral. UseNet news groups became
the focus of this analysis, because they were archived by Ddja.com in a
fully searchable form. 39 Messages can be searched by keyword, author,
date, and newsgroup.
Using Deja.com's search engine, I searched for the keyword
"Cassini" from April 1995 to August 1999. This resulted in a
population of 19,853 messages that had been posted from April 1995
through March 1999 which contained the word "Cassini" anywhere
(e.g., in the posted message, subject line, or author name). Since the
debate unfolded over four years, I ensured longitudinal
representativeness of messages by using "Cassini" as the keyword and
specifying dates by month, working backwards from the end of March
1999 to the beginning of April 1995. The number of postings varied
from a low of three comments in April 1995 to a high of 4,385 in
October 1997, the month of the spacecraft's launch.
38 CataList reports nearly 180,000 lists conducted through LISTSERV software alone
<http://www.lsoft.com/catalist.html>. List, now Topica.com, provides access to 80,000 lists
moderated through LISTSERV, ListProc, and Majordomo list management packages; over
35,000 IRC chat channels; and 30,000 UseNet news groups <http://www.liszt.coml>. PAML
catalogues over 7,000 publically available mailing lists, as vell <http://paml.net>.
39 Google, the search engine company, acquired the Ddja.com UseNet search engine in
February 2001. Thus, <http://-wvw.deja.com/home-ps.shtml> now transfers to <http://
groups.google.com/googlegroups/dejaannouncement.html>.
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I then sampled the discussion by viewing up to 250 messages in
each month, working backwards. Ddja.com sorted messages by
"relevance," basically the number of times the keyword turns up in a
message. From this maximum of 250 messages per month, I extracted
only those written in English on the subject of the spacecraft, saving the
author's name and E-mail address and an abstract of the message in a
word processor. Excluded were postings on "Cassini" topics unrelated
to the mission. 40 Furthermore, I saved only the most recent posting by
a given author and then categorized the author's stance on the basis of
this comment as "proponent," "opponent," or "neutral." If authors'
stances were not decipherable from these comments, I would then
search on these authors' names and "Cassini" to read their other
messages on the subject, until I could classify their stances.
Additionally, I did searches on all author names and "Cassini" to
identify numbers of postings on the subject per author as a crude
indicator of interest level. If people are highly interested in a debate,
chances are greater that they will contribute to it repeatedly.
This sampling process yielded comments by 937 authors who had
posted 8,020 messages on the subject, 40% of the "Cassini" messages
dating from the four-year study period. The authors were classified by
stance, central concerns raised, gender (the only detectable
demographic variable), affiliation with NASA and related institutions
or with opposition organizations, and whether their messages were
largely original compositions or forwards of another person's message.
Classification was done solely by myself, as funding did not allow the
training and hiring of a team of coding assistants. Single coder content
analysis may suffer from reduced reliability because it lacks a
mechanism for soliciting possibly divergent interpretations of a message
and then democratically deciding among such interpretations. On the
other hand, single coder content analysis does guarantee consistency in
40 There were many messages about Oleg Cassini, the fashion designer; Nadia Cassini, an
actress; and Jean-Dominique Cassini, the seventeenth century astronomer and discoverer of
Saturn, for whom the orbiter is named. There were also amateur astronomers' postings on the
Cassini Division or gap between Saturn's A and B rings; The Cassini Division, a science fiction
novel by Ken MacLeod; and a number of postings by authors surnamed Cassini.
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coding as one person applies a single approach to all messages rather
than training others who may apply that approach with varying levels of
motivation and understanding.
Later, the text database became the basis of a spreadsheet database
that included fields for author name, login nickname, E-mail address,
gender, basic stance, central concerns raised, and number of postings by
the author. I also noted whether the message had been originally
composed by the author or was basically a forward of someone else's
writing. Most of these fields are straightforward but, in light of the
one-coder methodology, it is appropriate to show a few of the
messages, randomly chosen, and how their author's stances and central
concerns were classified.
To that end, a handful of representative posts were extracted from
this database and listed in Figure 1, which is found at the following
Web address: <http://www.csulb.edu/-rodrigue/cassini/riskO 1 figure.
html>. To extract them, I used a random number generator and found
the message corresponding to a given random record number in the
spreadsheet. I then found the corresponding message in the text
database of UseNet messages and pasted them onto the web page. In
some of these, more than one concern is found in the message. I
classified them by the concern that the author wrote about most.
The database developed was then sorted on various fields to yield
the results summarized in the following tables. Significance levels are
generated from difference of proportions Z tests, with prob-values
< 0.05 considered significant.
Findings
The great majority of UseNet authors were supportive of the
mission: 60% were supporters; 21% were opponents; and 19% were
neutral (Table 1). Given the emotional power of nuclear dread, this
result was surprising. The opponents were, however, considerably more
vocal than the proponents or neutrals. The 21% of authors who were
opponents posted 31% of the messages (prob<0.001). The 19% of
neutral authors posted 13% of messages, significantly less than their
numbers (prob<0.001). The 60% of pro-Cassini authors posted 56% of
messages, which is signficantly less than expected (prob=0.005).
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Table 1
Stance by Gender
Stance Gender Individuals Posts
# 1 # %
Neutral female 7 3.9 10 0.9
male 139 78.1 930 87.5
organization 4 2.2 14 1.3
unknown 28 15.7 109 10.3
19.0% of authors 178 100.0 1063 100.0
13.3% of posts
Opponent female 16 8.2 103 4.1
male 132 68.0 2067 82.4
organization 6 3.1 121 4.8
unown 40 20.6 217 8.7
20.7% of authors 194 100.0 2508 100.0
31.3% of posts
Proponent female 19 3.4 154 3.5
male 468 82.8 3946 88.7
orgmization 3 0.5 24 0.5
unknown 75 13.3 325 7.3
60.3% of authors 565 100.0 4449 100.0
55.5% of posts
937=n (authors)
8020=n (posts made by these authors)
The only demographic difference discernible among the authors
was gender (Table 2). The debate was an overwhelmingly male
preserve. Fewer than 5% of authors were female; they contributed only
three percent of the posts. The Internet has been perceived as a largely
male domain, but the disparities between the percentages of women
contributing to this discussion are drastically greater than those of
women using the Internet itself, according to the statistically
representative telephone survey series by CommerceNet/Nielsen
Media Research Internet Demographic Study.4 1 In 1995, at the
beginning of the study period, women made up 33% of Internet users
in the United States and Canada versus 7% of identifiable participants
in the Cassini debate from April 1995 through March 1996. In 1999, at
the end of the study period, women constituted 46% of Internet uses
41 See Gail L. Grant, Internet Users Top 92 Million in the U.S. and Canada,
CommerceNet Research Note #99-26 (June 23, 1999) (available at
<http://www.commerce.net/research/reports/1999/99_26_n/99-26_n.html>).
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in the United States and Canada, versus 5% of Cassini discussion
participants from April 1998 through March 1999. While gender
disparities in user numbers are disappearing online, there remain
differences in the interests women and men pursue in online shopping
and purchasing activities, with men likelier than women to pursue
technological interests. This difference may account for the greater
likelihood of men to participate in an online technological risk
debate.42
Both genders in this debate were likelier to support Cassini than to
oppose it. Even so, there was a gender gap. Only 45% of the women
were mission-supporters, compared to 63% of the men (prob=0.019);
whereas 38% of the women were opponents, only 18% of the men were
(prob=0.002). Even if the genders had been equally represented among
the authors, proponents would still have been in the majority (54% of
the eighty one gender-identified authors, had they been equally male
and female), but the disparity would not have been so extreme
(opponents would have been 28% and neutrals, 18%).
The authors' stated concerns and stances suggest what activated
them to contribute to the social debate over Cassini (Table 3).
Opponents were dominated by three subtypes: 24% simply passed on
messages originating from about half a dozen people or organizations,
often without comment; another 24% wrote messages consisting of
independent expressions of concern about the risks of plutonium in
general or during the launch and flyby phases of this mission in
particular; and 21% were people interested in Nostradamus and
astrology, who expressed great fear that Cassini was the "King of
Terror" that Nostradamus had predicted would come from the skies
and destroy Earth in summer 1999 (the Earth flyby took place on
August 17-18, 1999).
42 Id.
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Table 2
Gender by Stance
Gender Stance Individuals Posts# % # %
Female neutral 7 16.7 10 3.7
opponent 16 38.1 103 38.6
proponent 19 45.2 154 57.7
4.5% of authors 42 100.0 267 100.0
3.3% of posts
Male neutral 139 18.8 930 13.4
opponent 132 17.9 2067 29.8
proponent 468 63.3 3946 56.8
78.0% of authors 739 100.0 6943 100.0
86.6% of posts
Organization neutral 4 30.8 14 8.8
opponent 6 46.2 121 76.1
proponent 3 23.1 24 15.1
1.5% of authors 13 100.0 159 100.0
2.0% of posts
Unknown neutral 28 19.6 109 16.7
opponent 40 28.0 217 33.3
proponent 75 52.4 325 49.9
16.0% of authors 143 100.0 651 100.0
8.1% of posts
937=n (authors)
8020=n (posts made by these authors)
Proponents, given their much larger numbers, discussed a wider
range of issues and concerns, with no one issue concerning as many as a
fifth of the authors. The most common statement, made by 17 % of
proponents, was that the opposition, though vocal, was very small and
unqualified to comment. Sixteen percent opined that the risk of the
mission or of RTGs was being grossly overstated. Thirteen percent
simply enthused about the mission and its goals. Another ten percent
engaged in rather nasty "flaming" of the opponents (slang for ad
hominem attacks). Only six percent forwarded other people's or
organizations' messages, usually something from a NASA publicity
office. The content of proponents' postings, then, emanated from
people enthusiastic about science and technology and comfortable with
conventional risk assessment analyses and results. That is, they seem
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more centrist in point of view, to use Douglas and Wildavsky's
phraseology.
Neutral messages fell into two categories. The most common of
these were questions or answers about very technical issues related to the
spacecraft's design, instrumentation, and objectives (40%). A distant
second were very elementary questions and answers, such as which
planet was Cassini's destination or why it takes so long for a spacecraft
to get there (11%). Another 8% were forwarded messages, and another
7% were basic questions from Nostradamus fans or queries about the
risk involved in the mission. Thus, the balance of the concerns expressed
emerges as more centrist than borderer.
Opponents were significantly more likely simply to pass on others'
messages (24 %) than were the other two groups (seven-percent of the
pooled 743), with a prob-value of <0.00 1. Forwarding others' opinions
reflects the tendency for time-pressed citizens to rely on trusted
reference groups' opinions in forming their own opinions on complex
issues unfamiliar to them. That opponents were likelier to resort to this
form of political communication than proponents may speak to the
center/border dichotomy as it applies to access to, and trust in,
conventional technological risk assessment information. Proponents
were far likelier to engage in individually-targeted flames (10%) than
were either opponents (2%) or neutrals (4%). The difference between
the proponents and the other two stances is significant at a prob-value
well below 0.001 and carries a whiff of center snobbery towards the
border.
Within the Nostradamus debate, opponents and neutrals were fans
of the sixteenth century astrologer-poet, while proponents were his
critic. Of those who commented on Nostradamus, 21% of the
opponents discussed him in connection with Cassini, as did 7% of the
neutrals and 4% of the Cassini proponents. Thus, opponents are
significantly more likely to come to this technological risk debate from
an ascientific and countercultural (border) perspective than the neutrals
and the proponents (prob<0.001).
The sample may not be representative of all those on the Internet
with an opinion on Cassini. It is likely that people who bestir themselves
to contribute to the debate are in some way self-interested in its
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outcome. For example, they may be employees of NASA, the ESA, the
ASI, or their subcontractors, or perhaps committed and activism-prone
members of opposition organizations.
To examine self-selection bias on the basis of self-interest, I
removed all 165 people with E-mails originating from the space
agencies, their contractors, and academic institutions having sizable
grants with them. I also removed seven people who posted from activist
organization addresses. I may have failed to cull individuals working or
volunteering in these organizations who maintain private E-mail
accounts not associated with their organizational affiliations. This is
especially likely to be true of opponents, who are less likely to have E-
mail accounts on their organization's domains (many Internet service
providers offering domain-hosting services for small businesses and
organizations limit the associated E-mail accounts to about twenty).
With these caveats, the easily-identifiable affiliates made up 18% of the
authors. Interestingly, they contributed 26% of the messages, a
disproportion (prob=0.022) suggestive of their passion on the subject
(Table 4).
By removing them, the database dropped to 765 authors and 5,912
messages originating from people with no discernible ties to Cassini and
the organizations that oppose it. Of these remaining authors, 20% are
neutral, slightly more than was the case with the full database
(prob=0.469). However, they posted 16% of messages, a somewhat
greater percentage than did the neutrals in the original database
(prob<0.001). Twenty three percent of the authors in the reduced
database are opponents, a slightly greater percentage than in the original
(prob=0.319), but they posted fully 38% of the messages, which is
quite a bit higher than was seen in the full database (prob<0.001). The
public left in the database who oppose the mission, then, emerge as
more likely to communicate their feelings. The percentage of
proponents in the revised database dropped insignificantly, from 60%
to 57% (prob=0.156), but these authors were less communicative about
their sentiments than was true when identifiable employees of NASA
and related institutions were left in. That is, the percentage of posts
from non-self-interested proponents dropped to 46% from the 56%
seen in the original database (prob<0.001).
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Table 3
Central Concerns Raised by Stance
Neutral Issues # %
Technical questions/answers 72 40.4
Asking/providing basic information 20 11.2
Passing on others' messages 14 7.9
Nostradamus fan asking basic question 13 7.3
Risk question 12 6.7
Flames 7 3.9
Costs, taxes 6 3.4
Politics/bureaucratization 5 2.8
Privatization of space 4 2.2
Vulnerabilty of big mission 2 1.1
Other 23 12.9
Sum 178 100.0
Opponent Issues # 9
Passing on others' messages 46 23.7
Risk 46 23.7
Nostradamus/astrology/666 fears 41 21.1
Calls to action 11 5.7
Costs, scale, opportunity costs 9 4.6
Censorship by media 7 3.6
Conspiracy/militarization of space 6 3.1
Flames 4 2.1
Privatization of space better than NASA 3 1.5
Other 21 10.8
Sum 194 100.0
Proponent Issues # %
Opponents a small # unqualified Luddites 95 16.8
Risk overstated, disproproportionate 91 16.1
Enthusiasm for the mission and space 73 12.9
Flames 59 10.4
Orbit/trajectory aimid to be safe 36 6.4
Passing on others's messages 36 6.4
Past nuke/RTG failures didn't kill life on earth 27 4.8
Solar not feasible 22 3.9
Big missions=big results 20 3.5
Nostradamus critiques 23 4.1
Cass budget doesn't allow for cruise science 16 2.8
Opportunity costs of opponent activism 11 1.9
Media consorship/bias against science 9 1.6
Calls to action 8 1.4




In all, the public left in the database were basically indistinguishable
from the full database in terms of the proportions of individuals
adhering to the three positions. Mission opponents left in the database,
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however, were more communicative about their views, which offers
support to the expectation that the emotional basis of opposition, dread
of nuclear contamination, is more compelling than that of support for
the mission. This is particularly evident when people whose livelihoods
may depend on the mission or on the space program (a potent
emotional driver!) are removed. Indeed, though proponents left in the
database dominated as individuals, their support was considerably more
tepid emotionally than when identifiably self-interested persons
remained in the database, at least as judged from the number of posts
they offered on the subject.
The result created by analysis of the non-self-interested public is
strengthened by comparison of those persons working for NASA and
its affiliated institutions with those with E-mail addresses in opponent
organization domains. Of the 165 people employed at NASA or
affiliated institutions, fully 79% were proponents, and 86% of their
1,965 messages were supportive of the mission. In contrast, all seven
people with E-mail accounts on the opponent organization domains
were mission opponents, and they posted 162 messages. Where, on
average, the 765 unaffiliated authors posted 7.7 messages on the topic
of Cassini, the 165 NASA-affiliated authors averaged 11.9 messages,
and the seven people identifiably in opponent organizations averaged
23.1 messages. Again, the disparity in numbers of messages in this
debate suggests the difference in intensity of motivation. Self-interest
and, especially, nuclear dread produce greater frequency of
communication.
Particularly striking with respect to the nature of UseNet
communication was the great influence of a very small number of
individuals in this debate. Some 24 % of opponents were passing along
messages from others. I traced these back and found that they
originated from about half a dozen individuals!
Rodrigue: Risk Amplification 243
Table 4
Stance by Gender
Stance Individuals Posts# 91 # %
Those with no traceable affiliation
Neutral 156 20.4 968 16.4
Opponent 174 22.7 2233 37.8
Proponent 435 56.9 2711 45.9
765=n (authors)
5912=n (posts made by these authors)
Those affiliated with NASA
Neutral 22 13.3 138 7.0
Opponent 13 7.9 136 6.9
Proponent 130 78.8 1695 86.1
165=n (authors)
1969=n (posts made by these authors)
Those affiliated with opponent organizations
Neutral 0 0.0 0 0.0
Opponent 7 100.0 162 100.0
Proponent 0 0.0 0 0.0
7=n (authors)
162=n (posts made by these authors)
The whole controversy began in print media articles by Karl
Grossman starting in 1995 that highlighted the amount of plutonium
on board Cassini-Huygens, questioned NASA's safety record, implied
a military connection to get Americans used to "nukes in space," and
drew attention to the large corporations, including NASA contractors,
with stakes in nuclear power. 4 3 Grossman was continuing a line of
articles he had written on the Galileo mission to Jupiter. His articles
were posted widely online, which he encouraged. 44 His writings would
43 See Grossman, supra n. 10, 13, 15, 19 & 26; Grossman & Mark, supra n. 19; Karl
Grossman, U.S. Slinging Plutonium into Space, The Cleveland Plain Dealer (May 22, 1996)
(available at <http:l/www.animatedsoftvare.comlcassini/kg9605pl.htm>).
44 See e.g. Karl Grossman, Nuclear Space Missions Break Down Political Barriers, 28 Just
Peace, Florida's Peace & Justice Newsp. (1993) (available at
<http:l/www.animatedsoftware.comlcassini/ kg9328jp.htm>); Karl Grossman, Kiss Florida
Goodbye?, N.Y. Times (Oct. 17, 1989) (available at <http://vxvw.animatedsoftware.com/
cassini/kg8910ny.htm>); Karl Grossman, We Don't Need Reactors in Space: Ignoring Safe
Solar Power, We Send Plutonium-Laden Probes into Orbit, Newsday: The Long Island
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be credible to many environmental and peace organizations, which
themselves serve as reference groups, because his work has often been
cited in the progressive Project Censored's4 5 annual list of news stories
that receive insufficient coverage.
In March 1997, Russell Hoffman, a very energetic individual who
owns a software company, became concerned by Grossman's arguments
and began to push them online vigorously in a series of Web-based
newsletters (Stop Cassini Newsletter).46 Many UseNet postings were
forwards of this newsletter. Jane Wardlow Prettyman, editor of The
Real News Page, now called American Review, began a web page
devoted to Cassini, called Disingenuous Digest: Analysis of News
Media Handling of Cassini.47
Three organizations became champions of the opposition: the
Florida Peace and Justice Center (Bruce Gagnon), 4 8 the Lovearth
environmentalist network,4 9 and the NoFlyBy group (Jonathan
Mark). 5 0 These early activists then recruited individuals with
credentials in areas including physics, such as Michio Kaku,5 1 John
Gofman, 52 Ross McCluney; 53 medicine or health physics, such as
Helen Caldicott, 54 Earl Budin,5 5 Ernest Sternglass, 56 and Horst A.
Newsp. (May 31, 1991) (available at <http:llwww.animatedsofrware.comlcassinil
kg9105we.hrm>); Karl Grossman, Plutonium Shuttle: The Space Probe's Lethal Cargo, The
Nation (Jan. 23, 1988) (available at <http://www.animatedsoftware.com/
cassini/kg88O ltn.htm>).
45 See Project Censored web page <http://www.projectcensored.org/intro.htm>.
46 See <http://www.animatedsoftware.com/cassini>.
47 See <http://wwv.americanreview.net/cassini.htm>.
48 See Bruce Gagnon, Cassini Is a Bad Seed, Rat Haus Reality (July 1997) (available at
<http://www.ratical.org/radiation/cassini.html>).
49 See <http://www.lovearth.net/> to get a sense of the Lovearth network, but their Cassini
materials had been removed at this writing.
50 See Jonathan Mark & Earl Budin, NASA Misleads the World on the Dangers of the
Cassini Space Ship's Fly-by of Earth, Global Network Against Weapons and Nuclear Power in
Space web site <http://www.globenet.free-online.co.uk/cassinilstopcass.htm>; Grossman &
Mark, supra n. 19; and the NoFlyBy web site, supra n. 16.
51 See Kaku, supra n. 10.
52 See Gofman, supra n. 7; PBS Forum, Risks vs. Returns: Is the Cassini Mission Safe?
(Oct. 21, 1997)(available at <http://www.pbs.org/newshour/forum/october97/ cassini4.html>).
53 See Ross McCluney, Solar Solutions For Cassini, The Cassini Debate and Beyond (Jane
W. Prettyman, ed.), American Review (Aug. 14, 1997) (available at
<http://www.americanreview.net/cassolar.htm>).
54 See Caldicott, supra n. 19; Helen Caldicott, Speech, NASA Ames Research Center, 125
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Poehler;57 and a former employee at Cape Canaveral, Alan Kohn.5 8
Each was willing to make public statements or speeches at
demonstrations encouraging opposition to Cassini, which then were
sent around UseNet and other Internet venues. Kaku, McCluney,
Budin, and Poehler were willing to write and post materials for the
cause, while Gofman, Caldicott, Sternglass, and Kohn permitted
themselves to be quoted on activist web sites. Many of these individuals
are well-known and widely respected in progressive political and
environmental circles, making their statements on this issue credible
among people who admire and trust them in other situations. Thus, this
whole controversy started with from one to eleven people, depending
on how far back one looks.
On the proponent side, nearly 6% of UseNet authors simply
forwarded others' messages. These were generally posts from NASA
publicity office personnel, notably Ron Baalke5 9 and Mary Beth
Murrill. 60 Eight percent of neutrals also forwarded others' messages.
The influence of key individuals, thus, was both proportionately and
absolutely less in the case of neutrals and proponents. Only the Cassini
opponents were able to make effective use of the power of chain-letters
forwarding. The success of chain-letters depends upon catching the
attention of readers and then motivating them to forward the message
to others. The dread elicited by opponent postings substituted for the
"bad things will happen to you if you do not immediately send this to
Stop Cassini Newsltr. (available at <http://www.animatedsoftvare.com/cassini/nltrsl
nltr0125.htm>).
55 See Mark & Budin, supra n. 50; Earl Budin, Letters to the UN (April 2, 1999) (available
at <http://www.flybynews.com/archives/ref/budin2.htm>); Budin (March 12, 1999) (available
at <http:llwww.flybynews.com/archiveslref/budin3.htm>).
56 See Russell D. Hoffman, Dr. Sternglass and Me, Stop Cassini (April 8, 1997) (available
at <http:llwww.animatedsoftware.com/cassini/ster9704.htm>).
57 See Horst A. Poehler, Cassini Cancers ("The Plutonium Story9, Stop Cassini (August
1997) (available at <http:/lwww.animatedsoftvare.com/cassini/hp9708ps.htm>.)
58 See Alan Kohn, Speech, Cape Canaveral Air Force Station Main Gates (July 26, 1997)
(available at <http://www.propl.orgl2000/cassini/9707kohn.htm>). Mr. Kohn was the
Emergency Preparedness Operations Officer at Cape Canaveral during the Galileo and Ulysses
launches.
59 Ron Baalke is a webmaster for JPL missions and publicizes mission events on UseNet
newsgroups.
60 Mary Beth Murrill is the News Chief for JPL and handles publicity concerning space
nuclear power and institutional environmental issues.
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ten of your friends" curse that typically accompanies other
contemporary E-mail chain-letters.
Discussion
In this section, findings are related back to the hypotheses
generated from hazards perception literature. Table 5 organizes the
research questions and their outcomes.
First, contrary to the expectations of hazards literature, this
technological risk debate does not seem driven by the issue of control
over the plutonium exposure, not even among the opponents. Fairness
questions are often raised as an explanation for public activism over
technological risk, but only two percent of authors in this debate on
UseNet brought up the issue of fairness, and they did so in a manner




1. Perceived control over exposure
2. Fairness of risks and benefits
3. Dread
4. Opponents more numerous and vocal
5. Suspicion of government
6. Demographic variations (gender)
7. Self-interest
8. Reliance on reference groups
9. Center/border dichotomy
10. Internet as effective political medium
Not a focus
Not a focus
Central axis of debate
Less numerous, more vocal
Some evidence both sides
Few women, plurality does support mission, gender
gap: fewer women support mission than men do
Public supports mission, self-interest is evident
Opponents forward others' messages more than
proponents and neutrals do
Opponents more counter-cultural (Nostradamus),
more reliant on reference groups
Half dozen people started impressive movement
that made Cassini very controversial at national
and local levels
Second, there was a significant gender gap, which has emerged in
other hazards perception studies, with women more doubtful about the
assumption of this technological risk. Even so, a greater percentage of
women supported the Cassini mission than were neutral or opposed to
it. The most striking manifestation of gender in this debate, however,
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was the near invisibility of women among the 937 authors (only 42).
Online space-related technological risk discussion remains a male
preserve.
Third, and perfectly in accordance with prior literature, dread is the
central axis in this hazards debate. Two thirds of opponents expressed
dread of nuclear contamination, and the Nostradamus discussants
seemed quite terrified that Cassini would bring about the predicted
end of the world. Over a quarter of the proponents addressed the dread
factor, too, mainly by trivializing the probability of an accident and the
consequences of an accident should one occur.
Another factor mentioned in hazards literature is mistrust of public
institutions, and it is a secondary theme in this debate. Six opponents
said that there is a NASA conspiracy to militarize space and the
plutonium on Cassini is merely the camel's nose in the tent, while
another seven stated that the media were censoring the plutonium risks
of Cassini. Both of these arguments are often cited in the forty six
messages forwarded by opponents. Even a few proponents (nine) said
they thought the media were biased towards the opponents and were
not allowing NASA the chance to defend the mission and its goals. So,
mistrust of national government and of media is present among
opponents of the mission and, in the case of the media, this mistrust is
shared by a few proponents, too.
Fourth, surprisingly, given the level of dread attached to plutonium,
more UseNet contributors supported the mission than opposed it, even
when self-interested people were removed. Self interest did affect the
authors' propensity to communicate in this controversy, however. When
discernibly self-interested persons were removed from the database,
there was no significant change in the balance of authors among the
opponent, proponent, and neutral stances towards Cassini-Huygens,
but there was a very significant shift in the volume of communications
coming from each stance. The more loquacious proponents in the
original database seem to have been those in Douglas and Wildavsky's
center, people involved in the mission or in the space program, closer to
the center of political power in this issue, and obviously much more
comfortable with conventional risk assessment and trade-offs between
risk and gain. When these more "central" people are removed, a more
communicative and passionate periphery is seen, one skeptical of risk
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assessment science, mistrustful of government, and oppositional in
communication style.
Fifth, suggestions of the center/border dichotomy also show up in
this debate in the form of Nostradamus. Nostradamus' predictions
appeal to some non-scientists, especially those inclined to New Age and
other classically counter-cultural movements. These movements
explicitly question scientific logic and method, denigrating science as
merely a privileged, but not an epistemologically superior way of
knowing the world and making decisions. 6 1 The New Age and
Nostradamus fit the counter-cultural quality of Douglas and
Wildavsky's border. It is not surprising that fans of Nostradamus were
prominent among the opponents to Cassini-Huygens 62 and that all
but 2 of the 13 proponents who addressed Nostradamus' "King of
Terror" were debunkers of astrology and the New Age.
The tendency to forward others' messages is indicative of both the
center/border split and the tendency for time-pressed people to rely on
the judgments of reference groups they trust. The amount of research
necessary to understand the details of the plutonium controversy is
beyond most people's time and energy, and yet in a democratic society
it is an important social issue. Few people outside the borders of the
space program and its contributing institutions are familiar with the
technology, while those more central to the program may be both
familiar with it and self-interested in the outcome of the debate. Those
persons on the outside necessarily depend on other people's opinions,
judgments, and analyses; hence, the opposition more strikingly used the
61 See e.g. Robert Anton Wilson, The New Inquisition: Irrational Rationalism and the
Citadel of Science (Falcon Press 1987).
62 The main organizers of the anti-Cassini movement were conflicted over this Nostradamus
angle that had descended on them. Russell Hoffman was appalled at the development, fearing
for the credibility of the movement. He wrote "Right now, I think the BIGGEST problem
facing the movement is that NASAIJPL is trying to make it look like there is no scientific
objection to Cassini - instead, pretending that there is only Nostradamus-related confusion."
See Stop Cassini Newsltr. 93 (Feb. 9, 1999) (available at <http://www.animatedsoftvare.
com/cassini/nltrs/nltrOO93.htm>). The NoFlyBy people decided to encourage the
Nostradamus fans in an "enemy of my enemy is my friend" strategy, expressed in their
response to "an appeal for information on Nostradamus or other possible pathways to lead to
the interest of the media, even including the tabloids. It is not the time to be fussy." See
NoFlyby Newsltr. 9 (Dec. 23, 1998) (available at: http://www.flybynews.com
/archives/alerts/9.htm>).
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forwarding of other people's messages to communicate its concerns and
suspicions.
Finally, the vanguard of this movement utilized border themes and
complaints to recruit others to spread the message. The forwarded
messages appealed to suspicions of NASA and the military-industrial
complex: bodily pollution being imposed by greedy powers;
perceptions of science as the corrupt servant of insane elites; astrological
concerns about the "grand cross" of 18 August 1999; and claims that
the "Ancients" had detailed knowledge of plutonium. The messages,
thus, were embedded in a matrix of pre-existing border beliefs that
made them credible to many of their recipients. Incorporated in that
matrix were elements shown to bear on perception of technological risk
and arouse concern. Dread, above all, and mistrust of public institutions
responsible for informing the public about and protecting the public
from hazardous technologies.
Conclusions
Risk assessment is a probabilistic, statistical science, not a
deterministic, experimental one. Its conclusions inescapably carry the
hazards of Type I and Type II errors, and the minimization of one of
these errors generally raises the probability of the other. We assume a
hazard exists or a technology is dangerous unless shown otherwise by
tests with very low prob-values. However, high confidence in the name
of human safety may exact opportunity costs in knowledge or
economic benefits foregone, while minimizing opportunity costs may
increase danger.
Standards in hazard assessment science are inherently political
choices. It is a policy decision to manage a hazard to promote human
safety and accept opportunity costs or to manage it so as to minimize
the opportunity costs of regulation and accept lower levels of human
safety. Assessment science and management policy must inform one
another, but the relationship is unavoidably controversial. Media can
create, enhance, or obscure controversy on any given hazard assessment
and decision-making process through coverage of the interaction
between experts and activists, which may in turn result in activist
recruitment among the public to apply pressure to risk management
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policy-makers.
Traditional print and broadcast media, which wring out the
sensation and drama in a disastrous event or hazardous situation and
then move on to other, more "newsworthy" stories, sometimes leave
information needs unmet. Risk assessment scientists and risk-
management policy-makers cannot control such media. Activists are
only marginally more capable of reliably hooking coverage.
The Internet is an emerging way to get information past the control
of traditional media decision-makers. The Internet requires a
vanishingly small price of entry compared with the entry price required
in the highly oligopolistic conventional media. It is also growing
explosively into a densely interacting global community. The Cassini
controversy demonstrates the power the Internet offers to political
activists to affect the agendas of policy decision-makers, particularly if
the channels chosen include those not dependent on an audience
actively looking for information on a given topic as does the Web.
Using E-mail, listservers, newsgroups, or chats, a handful of people can
alert others to an issue of concern and enlist them to spread the news.
The population passively receiving these notices expands exponentially.
Even if just a small percentage of those exposed to the idea responds
politically, the result can be tremendous political pressure.
This kind of audience-passive Internet communication offers a
counterweight to the political influence of great corporations and
wealthy individuals, which normally dominate the traditional print and
broadcast media because of the cost of entry. It is potentially very
empowering to ordinary citizens. Democratization is the great strength
of the Internet in the sense that it allows a wider cross-section of society
to generate effective political pressure.
The demagogic use of the Internet, however, remains the shadow of
democratic empowerment. Sensationalism, conspiracies, ad hominem
attacks, exaggeration, and other emotionally-manipulative devices are
abundant in the Cassini debate, particularly among the opponents but
also among flame-prone proponents.
The technological hazard case of Cassini raises issues of expert
qualification, the acceptability of risk, and the tension between
democracy and demagoguery in cyberspace. Independent risk
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assessment of the plutonium on board Cassini deemed the hazard tiny
in probability and trivial in consequence. This assessment did not
comfort those who deeply dread nuclear technology in any form
whatsoever or who profoundly mistrust government. They found
experts to claim high probabilities of disaster and extremely serious
consequences, some of whom spoke out on topics outside their
expertise without benefit of peer review.
As this battle raged on in the listservers, chat rooms, and UseNet
groups, it had all the appearance of dueling risk assessment experts.
Thus, expertise was delegitimated. People encountering the messages
over the issue were on their own to decide if Cassini was a mortal
danger or not, with an array of experts among whom to cherry-pick in
support of their decision after the fact.
The complex nature of Cassini and of many other technological
and natural hazard controversies makes them baffling to the average
citizen. The citizen yet must decide whether to act politically about
such controversies or, worse for a democratic society, remain
uninformed and apathetic.
This is a dilemma we all face as citizens, scientists or not. We have
to make political judgments, and we simply do not have the time to
research issues far from our training and everyday concerns. So we take
shortcuts to form our opinions - we tend to defer to the opinions of
people and organizations we trust. New media make it possible for a
handful of people to tap this mechanism of trust and by using their
computer's forward button, mobilize a politically potent movement
over a socially-amplified hazard. This powerful new phenomenon
perhaps deflects us from taking effective political action on more
significant hazards. Hazard misperception exacts an opportunity cost in
civic organizing time and energy.
What does this controversy teach about risk assessment and risk
management decision-making as this new medium emerges to shape
hazard perceptions on the part of the public? For risk assessment
scientists, the advent of the Internet means more effective opposition to
the technology being proposed. This puts the onus on scientists to
clearly state and justify all assumptions, procedures, and logic used to
assess a risk. Among those assumptions must be a statement of the
policy informing assessment: How has the proper balance between
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human safety costs and scientific or economic opportunity costs been
chosen?
There is now an urgent need to make this transparent in documents
written specifically and clearly for the lay public and placed online. This
public communication in many ways is harder than the original risk
assessment. It would help if risk communicators became very familiar
with the axes most likely to trigger public credibility and anticipate
how they will play out in a given situation. This may entail hiring
outside consultants, as most risk assessment scientists do not have the
communications background or inclination for such a project.
The alternative is to have that process explained to the public by a
hostile party. JPL did put its various environmental impact statements
online,6 3 and effort was made to justify the risks involved at a very
elementary level. 6 4 The intermediate level of explanation was
dominated by the critics who were able to situate their explanations and
criticisms within the larger suspicions of an alienated public.
Risk management decision-makers, particularly politicians, will be
hearing more frequently from a larger sample of the public as the
Internet becomes more and more ubiquitous. In this sense, Internet
communications may better represent the feelings of the general
electorate by dint of reducing small sample effects. As the effort
involved in constituent communication becomes ever smaller, however,
it is becoming harder to discern just how much political commitment
constituents have on an issue. Traditionally, elected officials assumed
that one paper letter, because it took so much effort to write, might
represent the feelings of a much larger number of constituents without
the time to write. A swarm of E-mail, however, might come from a
sample of people to whom the issue means just barely enough to cause
them to hit a forward button.
In the case of a given technological or natural hazard debate, this
sample, whatever it represents, may be responding to demagoguery,
self-interest, or the well-informed consideration of risks and benefits.
63 See e.g. <http://www.jpl.nasa.gov/cassini/english/msnsafe/introlinks.html>.
64 See e.g. <http://www.jpl.nasa.gov/cassini/english/msnsafe/>, although this was updated
and substantially improved in May 2000.
Note: All links given here were verified as working as of 11/07/01. As time goes on,
however, their accuracy will degrade as web authors change their sites or close them.
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The source of political pressure may not be too apparent when decision-
makers consider hazard policy management. While one would hope
that decision-makers rely on risk assessment science in framing their
responses, they do so in an atmosphere of political risk and uncertainty,
with Type I and Type II hazards to their own careers.
For activists, the Cassini controversy illuminates the possibility of
tremendous empowerment of individuals. In this case, a handful of
people became an effective vanguard for a mass movement that might
just have been able to shut this mission down. The movement might
have been successful had Internet organizing been available when the
mission was most vulnerable to cancellation, during the 1992 economic
crisis and the ensuing congressional cost-cutting frenzy. On the other
hand, the electronic frontier does not guarantee success. Cassini-
Huygens was launched and the Earth gravity-assist went forward, both
safely. Despite the exponential transmission of a handful of people's
oppositional messages, the majority online remained unconvinced of
the risk despite appeals to the end of the world. Apparently, there are
limits to success in online organizing. It is in the interest of activists to
find out just what those limits are and to respect them.
The Internet clearly can confer a measure of political agenda-setting
power on a wide cross-section of society. Individuals highly placed in
corporate management and major political contributors may find their
own power more often and more effectively contested and diffused
among "Netizens." In its ability to diffuse agenda-setting power,
Internet organizing promotes democratization. Demagoguery,
however, remains the shadow of empowerment, and its hallmarks are in
this debate. However the dance of empowerment and demagoguery
may play out in the hazard debates of the future, it is well to remember
the remark of Thomas Jefferson in a letter to William C. Jarvis,
Monticello, September 28, 1821:65
I know no safe depository of the ultimate powers of
society but the people themselves; and if we think
them not enlightened enough to exercise their control
65 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William C. Jarvis (Sept. 28, 1821), in Writings of
Thomas Jefferson in Twelve Volumes vol. 10 (G.P. Putnam's Sons 1904) (available at
<http://memory.loc.gov/msslmtj/mtj 1/05210200/0276.jpg>).
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with a wholesome discretion, the remedy is not to take
it from them, but to inform their discretion.
